SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995
1981

Title 41 Chapter 06 Article 08-12: Turns and Signals to Railroad
Trains - 1981
Utah Code Annotated

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/uca

The Utah Code Annotated digital collection, hosted by Digital Commons, is brought to you for
free and open access by the James E. Faust Law Library at the S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Funds for this project have been provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
through the Library Services and Technology Act and are administered by the Utah State Library
Division. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu. Reprinted with
permission. Copyright 2020 LexisNexis. All rights reserved.
Recommended Citation
Utah Code Annotated Title 41-6 (Michie, 1981)

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995 by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

41-6-65

MOTOR VEHICLEE;

central dividing curb, separation section, or
line" after "No person shall" at the beginning of the section; and made a minor change
in phraseology.

The 1979 amendment substituted
trolled-access" for "limited-access."
Cross-References.
Limited-access
27-12-111et seq.

facilities

"con-

generally,

41-6-65. Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or
kind of traffic - Traffic-control devices. The department of transportation by resolution or order entered in its minutes, and local authorities
by ordinance may regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access
roadway within their respective jurisdictions by any class or kind of traffic
which is found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of
traffic.
The department of transportation or the local authority adopting any
such prohibition shall erect and maintain official traffic-control devices on
the controlled-access highway on which such prohibitions are applicable
and when in place no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such
devices.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.12, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 21; 1979,
ch. 242, § 18.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "regulate
or prohibit the use of * * * and safe movement of traffic" in the first paragraph for
"with respect to any limited-access roadway
under their respective jurisdictions, prohibit
the use of any such roadway by pedestrians,

bicycles, or other .nonmotorized traffic, or by
any person operating a motor-driven cycle";
substituted in ·the second paragraph, "highway" for "roadway," "traffic-control devices"
for "official signs"; and made minor changes
in phraseology.
The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for "state road commission" in two places; and substituted "controlled-access" for "limited-access" in two
places.

ARTICLE 8
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING
OR TURNING
Section
41-6-66.
41-6-67.
41-6-68.
41-6-69.

Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices.
Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of grade.
Starting vehicles.
Turning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal flashing prohibited.
41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps.
41-6-71. Signals - Manner of giving.

41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. The driver
of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows:
(1) Right Turns - Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn
shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway.
(2) Left Turns - The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to
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traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme
left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction
as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.
(3) The department of transportation
and local authorities in their
respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be
placed and thereby require and direct that a different course from that
specified in this section be traveled by vehicles turning, and when such
devices are so placed no driver of a vehicle shall turn a vehicle other than
as directed and required by such devices.
(4) Where a special lane for making left turns by drivers proceeding
in opposite directions has been indicated by official traffic-control devices:
(a) A left turn shall not be made from any other lane.
(b) A vehicle shall not be driven in the lane except when preparing for
or making a left turn from or into the roadway or when preparing for or
making a U-turn when otherwise permitted by law.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943,
57-7-130; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 22; 1978, ch. 33, § 17.

"vehicles turning" and after "turn a vehicle"
in subd. (3); added subd. (4); and made minor
changes in phraseology.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment rewrote the regulations relating to left turns.
The 1975 amendment deleted "at an intersection" after "intending to turn" in the
introductory phrase; inserted "Right Turns"
at the beginning of subd. (a); rewrote subd.
(b) relating to left turns; deleted a subd. (c)
relating to left turns; redesignated former
subd. (d) as subd. (c); inserted "The state
road commission" at the beginning of subd.
(c); substituted references to official trafficcontrol devices for references to markers,
buttons or signs throughout subd. (c); and
made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); substituted "department of transportation" near the beginning
of subd. (3) for "state road commission";
deleted "within or adjacent to intersections"
after "devices to be placed" in the middle of
subd. (3); deleted "at an intersection" after

Collateral References.
Automobiles <S:;o 171(12).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 367.
Turning, 7A AmJur 2d 431-434, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 256-259.
Drivers of automobiles or other vehicles
proceeding in same direction, reciprocal
duties of, with respect to turning at intersections, 24 ALR 513, 47 ALR 712, 62 ALR 980,
104 ALR 531.
Failure of motorist to give signal for left
turn at intersection, as against oncoming or
intercepting motor vehicle, liability for accident arising from, 39 ALR 2d 65.
Failure of motorist to give signal for left
turn between intersections, liability for accident arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103.
Violation of statute by motorist's failure to
give signal for left turn at intersection with
respect to motor vehicle proceeding in same
direction, 39 ALR 2d 32.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Contributory negligence.
Whether decedent's turn from an improper
position on the highway without signaling

was contributory negligence was question for
jury under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas
Moving & Storage, Inc. (1971) 451 F 2d 319.

41-6-67. Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of
grade. (a) The driver of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to
proceed in the opposite direction unless such movement can be made in
safety and without interfering with other traffic.
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(b) No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction
upon any curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, ·
where such vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle
approaching from either direction within 500 feet.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 54; C. 1943,
57-7-131;L. 1975,ch. 207, § 23.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment inserted subsec. (a);
and designated the former section as subsec.
(b).

Care required of plaintiff.
The general rules as to degree of care
required of a person acting in an emergency,

created by wrongful act or negligence of
defendant, apply to this section. Morrison v.
Perry (1942) 104 U 139, 122 P 2d 191, reversed
on rehearing 104 U 151, 140 P 2d 772.
Collateral References.
Liability arising from collision between
automobile making U-turn and another vehicle, 6 ALR 2d 1244.

41-6-68. Starting vehicles. No person shall start a vehicle which is
stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety.
History:
57-7-132.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943,

Sufficiency of evidence.
In action for damages arising out of collision between motorcycle and truck, evidence
was sufficient to support jury's finding that
defendant, in violation of this section, moved
his truck onto highway, from point where
truck was parked on shoulder of highway,

before such movement could be made with
reasonable safety. Spackman v. Carson (1950)
117 U 390,216 P 2d 640.
Collateral References.
Automobiles~
173(8).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 334.
7A AmJur 2d 463, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 282.

41-6-69. Tlll'ning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in
speed - Signal flashing prohibited. (1) No person shall turn a vehicle
or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can
be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal
in the manner hereinafter provided.
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall
be given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the
beginning of the turn or change.
(3) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle
without first giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle
immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such a signal.
(4) The signals required on vehicles by section 41-6-70 shall not be
flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do
pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, nor be
flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle except as may be necessary
for compliance with this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943,
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1;
1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment rewrote subsec. (a)
which included a requirement for giving a

368

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if
any pedestrian may be affected by turning
from a direct course upon a highway.
The 1971 amendment deleted "in the event
any other traffic may be affected by such
movement" at the end of subsec. (a); inserted
"or to change lanes" in subsec. (b); substituted "for at least the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the run or change"
for "during not less than the last 100 feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning" in
subsec. (b); deleted "in the manner provided
herein" after "appropriate signal" in subsec.
(c); and made a minor change in style.
The 1975 amendment added "in the event
any other traffic may be affected by such
movement" to subsec. (a); and added subsec.
(d).

The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (d) as (1) to (4); deleted "at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position
upon the roadway as required in section
41-6-66, or turn a vehicle to enter a private
road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle
from a direct course" after "turn a vehicle"
near the beginning of subsec. (1); deleted "in
the event any other traffic may be affected by
such movement" at the end of subsec. (l);
and made minor changes in phraseology.
Determination of matter of "reasonable
safety."
Facts may be so clear and indisputable
that it may be said as a matter of law that
turn could not be made "with reasonable
safety," and that defendant's act in turning
was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate
cause of the collision and resulting damage,
thus leaving to the jury the determination of
the amount of such damage. Cederloff v.
Whited (1946) 110 U 45, 169 P 2d 777.
Effect of infant's age and capacity upon
statutory duty.
Consideration of infant's age and capacity
should prevail over rule establishing negligence as a matter of law upon violation of
statutory duty; this does not mean that state
utory violation rule is nullified where children are involved. Morby v. Rogers (1953) 122
U 540, 252 P 2d 231 (case of 13-year-old
bicyclist who turned without signaling).

41-6-69

Injury to pedestrians.
Pedestrian denied recovery for injuries
sustained when she was struck by overhang
of motorbus, where from the evidence it
appeared that when she was halfway across
the street the traffic light changed against
her and she stopped in the safety zone, giving
the other traffic the right-of-way, and that
the overhang of the bus struck her as it
rounded the corner in response to traffic
officer's express direction. Miller v. Utah
Light & Traction Co. (1939) 96 U 369, 86 P 2d
37.
Proximate cause.
Whether a truck driver was negligent in
failing to look in rearview mirror at the time
of a left turn, and whether his negligence, if
any, was a proximate cause of the injury
were questions for the jury. Hayden v.
Cederlund (1953) 1 U 2d 171, 263 P 2d 796.
Signal for stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.
Held that where statute required .defendant to give an appropriate signal before
stopping or suddenly decreasing his speed
and no hand signal was given, the visible
light showing the application of defendant's
brakes was not compliance with the statute
since it was simultaneous with the sudden
decrease in speed, while the statute requires
that an appropriate signal be given prior to
stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of
a vehicle. United States v. First Security
Bank (1953) 208 F 2d 424, 42 ALR 2d 951.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <P 151.
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 287.
Construction and operation of regulations
as to sudden stop or slowing of motor vehicle,
29 ALR 2d 5.
Duty of motor vehicle driver approaching
place where children are playing or gathered,
to stop or slow down, 30 ALR 2d 1030.
Failure of motorist to give signal for left
turn between intersections, liability for accident arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103.
Liability for accident arising out of
motorist's failure to give signal for right
turn, 38 ALR 2d 143.
Unsignaled stop or slowing of motor vehicle as negligence, 29 ALR 2d 5.

DECISIONS UNDER FORME.RLAW
Contributory negligence.
Whether decedent's turn from an improper
position on the highway without signaling

was contributory negligence was question for
jury under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas
Moving & Storage, Inc. (1971) 451 F 2d 319.
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41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps. (1) Any stop
or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and arm
or by signal lamps, except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) Any motor vehicle in use on a highway shall be equipped with, and
required signal shall be given by, signal lamps when the distance from the
center of the top of the steering post to the left outside limit of the body,
cab or load of such motor vehicle exceeds twenty-four inches, or when the
distance from the center of the top of the steering post to the rear limit
of the body or load thereof exceeds fourteen feet. The latter measurement
shall apply to any single vehicle, also to any combination of vehicles.
History:
L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943,
57-7-134;L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 4;
1978, ch. 33, § 19.
Compiler's Notes.

The 1955 amendment substituted "except
as provided in paragraph (b)" at the end of
subsec. (a) for "but when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded that a hand and arm signal would not be visible both to the front and
rear of such vehicle then said signals must be
given by such a lamp or device"; and added
subsec. (b ).
The 1957 amendment substituted "a signal" for "a signal lamp or signal device" in

subsec. (a); substituted "said lamps" for "or
mechanical signal device, said lamps or
devices" in the first sentence of subsec. (b);
and changed the effective date from 1956 to
1958.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); deleted references
to signal lamps approved by the state road
commission in two places; deleted "The
requirements of this section shall become
effective January 1, 1958" at the end of the
section; and made minor changes in phraseology.

41-6-71. Signals - Manner of g1vtng. All signals herein required
given by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle
in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows:
(1) Left turn. Hand and arm extended horizontally.
(2) Right turn. Hand and arm extended upward.
(3) Stop or decrease speed. Hand and arm extended downward.
History:

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 58; C. 1943,

57-7-135.
ARTICLE 9
RIGHT OF WAY

Section
41-6-72.
Right of way between vehicles.
41-6-72.10. Right of way - Stop or yield signals - Collisions at intersections or junctions
of roadways.
41-6-73.
Vehicle turning left.
41-6-74.
Vehicle entering a through highway.
41-6-74.10. Failure to yield right of way - Effect of collision - Rule on entering stop or
yield intersection.
41-6-75.
Entering or crossing highway other than from another roadway.
Emergency vehicle - Duties of respective drivers.
41-6-76.
41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway - Right of way.

41-6-72. Right of way between vehicles. (a) When two vehicles enter
or approach an intersection from different highways at approximately the
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same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way
to the vehicle on the right.
(b) The right-of-way rule declared in paragraph (a) is modified at
through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 59; C. 1943,
57-7-136; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 25.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment
inserted
"or
approach" and "approximately" in the subsection regarding right-of-way for two vehicles; and made a minor change in phraseology.
The 1975 amendment deleted a subsec. (a)
which provided that an approaching driver
should yield the right-of-way to a vehicle
which has already entered the intersection
from a different highway; and redesignated
former subsecs. (b) and (c) as (a) and (b).
Construction and application.
In crowded street greater degree of care
and vigilance is required in approaching
intersections
and crossings where both
pedestrians and vehicles of all kinds have
right to pass both ways, than is case between
street crossings. Richards v. Palace Laundry
Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439.
The rights and duties prescribed by this
section are only relative, and must be applied
in the light of the conditions existing at the
time. It is the duty of both parties to use
such caution as a reasonably prudent person
would have done in entering the intersection
and to yield the right-of-way if under the circumstances a reaonably prudent person
would have done so. If failure to yield rightof-way proximately contributed to the accident, that may bar plaintiff or render defendant liable. Smith v. Lenzi (1929) 74 U 362,
279 P 893, applying former Motor Vehicle
Law.
The rights of the possessor of the right-ofway under this section are only relative, and
one is not relieved of the duty of using due
care simply because he is the apparent possessor of the right-of-way. The question is:
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident and injury, and not simply who
entered the intersection first. Sine v. Salt
Lake Transp. Co. (1944) 106 U 289, 147 P 2d
875, following Bullock v. Luke (1940) 98 U
501, 98 P 2d 350.
Contributory
negligence
of favored
driver.
Although driver approaching from right
had right-of-way over driver approaching
from left, right is not absolute and one who

has it may not claim it in face of danger
which one exercising due care could see and
avoid; driver having right-of-way was nevertheless contributorily negligent in light of
evidence that he had not kept proper lookout.
Hughes v. Hooper (1967) 19 U 2d 389, 431 P
2d 983.
Duty to yield.
Driver on left at street intersection is not
required to yield right-of-way to driver
approaching from right unless collision is to
be "reasonably apprehended." Collins v.
Liddle (1926) 67 U 242, 247 P 476.
Duty of drivers at street intersections is
discussed at length in Sine v. Salt Lake
Transp. Co. (1944) 106 U 289, 147 P 2d 875.
Motorist approaching intersection from
right had right-of-way
over motorist
approaching from left if former either
reached intersection first or at same time as
latter. Martin v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478,
189 P 2d 127.
Evidence and questions for jury.
In action arising out of intersection collision, evidence sufficiently established prima
facie case of negligence on part of defendant
in failing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at excessive rate of speed, and contributory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478, 189 P 2d 127.
The mere fact that a driver has the rightof-way does not excuse him from exercising
due care and keeping a proper lookout to
avoid collisions with vehicles failing to yield;
however, questions relating to rights and
duties of drivers approaching intersections
are primarily problems to be resolved by the
trier of fact and only when reasonable minds
could not differ in reaching a contrary determination does it become necessary to upset
these factual resolutions. Country Club Foods
v. Barney (1960) 10 U 2d 317,352 P 2d 776.
Collateral References.
Automobiles ea> 171(4).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 363.
Right of way, 7A AmJur 2d 410 et seq.,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236 et
seq.
Automobile crossing street at a point other
than a street intersection, 57 ALR 1106.
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Duty of driver of vehicle approaching
intersection of one-way street with other
street, 62 ALR 2d 275.
Negligence, right of way at street or highway intersections as dependent upon, or independent of, 89 ALR 838,136 ALR 1497.
Right of way as between vehicles as
affected by relative distances or time of
reaching intersection, 175 ALR 1013.

Right of way at street or highway intersections, 21 ALR 974, 37 ALR 493, 47 ALR 595.
Streetcar colliding with automobile at
intersection, liability for injuries, 28 ALR
217, 46 ALR 1000.
What is street or highway intersection
within traffic rules, 7 ALR 3d 1204.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Motor bike driver.
"Driver" as used in this section included
thirteen-year-old motor bike driver; and his

failure to yield right-of-way barred his
recovery for injuries sustained when struck
by motorist. Stevens v. Salt Lake County
(1970) 25 U 2d 168, 478 P 2d 496.

41-6-72.10. Right of way - Stop or yield signals - Collisions at
intersections or junctions of roadways. (1) Preferential right of way
may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in section
41-6-99.

(2) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every driver of
a vehicle approaching the stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop
line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the
intersection, or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway
where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the
right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time
when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction
of roadways.
(3) The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience
to such sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions
and if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line,
and if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where
the driver has a view of approaching traffic <;mthe intersecting roadway
before entering it. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the
right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time
such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. Provided, that if such a driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle
in the intersection or junction of roadways, after driving past a yield sign
without stopping, such collision is prima facie evidence of the driver's failure to yield the right of way.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-72.10,enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 26; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 20.

Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 26 repealed old
section 41-6-72.10 (L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961,
ch. 86, § 1), relating to right-of-way between
vehicles, and enacted new section 41-6-72.10.
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The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); deleted "at an intersection" after "right of way" in subsec. (1); substituted "or junction of roadways, after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such
collision is prima facie evidence of the
driver's failure to yield the right of way" at
the end of subsec. (3) for "the vehicle division
shall forward a copy of the notice to the
owner or person in charge of the garage or
place where the vehicle is stored"; deleted
former subsecs. (d) and (e) which read:
"(d) For the purposes of this section, a
vehicle shall be presumed to be abandoned if
it is left unattended on a highway for a
period in excess of 24 hours or on any public
or private property without express or
implied consent of the owner or person in
lawful possession or control of the property
for a period in excess of seven days.

41-6-73

"(e) In the event a vehicle is not
reclaimed by the registered owner or any lien
holder within thirty days, the provisions of
sections 41-1-79.5, 41-1-116, and 41-1-117
shall apply"; and made minor changes in
phraseology.
Immediate hazard.
Testimony that disfavored vehicle was well
into or through intersection at time of collision with favored vehicle did not establish
that approaching favored vehicle was not an
immediate hazard. Cintron v. Milkovich
(1980) 611 P 2d 730.
Speeding drivers.
Right-of-way is not transferred to a disfavored driver by fact that favored driver
exceeds the posted speed. Cintron v.
Milkovich (1980) 611 P 2d 730.

41-6-73. Vehicle turning left. The driver of a vehicle intending to turn
to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction which is within the intersection or so close to the turning vehicle
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 60; C. 1943,
57-7-137; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 27.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment substituted "during
the time when such driver is moving within
the intersection" for "but said driver, having
so yielded and having given a signal when
and as required by this act, may make such
left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles
approaching the intersection from said opposite direction shall yield the right of way to
the vehicle making the left turn."
The 1975 amendment inserted "or into an
alley, private road, or driveway"; deleted
"during the time when such driver is moving
within the intersection" at the end of the
section; and made minor changes in phraseology.
Burden placed on driver making turn.
When a statute prescribes that a turning
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to
another on a straight of way when the latter
is close enough to constitute a hazard, it
anticipates the exercise of reasonable judgment on the part of the driver turning. However, a burden is placed on the driver making
the turn as he has control of the situation,
and if there is a reasonable probability that
the movement cannot be made in safety then
the disfavored driver should yield. French v.

Utah Oil Refining Co. (1950) 117 U 406, 216 P
2d 1002.
Evidence.
Where prosecution grew out of a collision
at an intersection, due to alleged reckless
driving of defendant in making turn in violation of this section, Supreme Court thought
"there was ample evidence of conduct of
defendant which jury could properly find was
reckless and in marked disregard for the
rights and safety of others." State v. Newton
(1943) 105 U 561, 144 P 2d 290.
Fulfillment of duty.
If the left-turner, in performing his duty
under this section by making the required
observation, sees no vehicle approaching, or
that any coming are far enough away so that
the left-turner can reasonably believe that he
has time to make his turn, he may proceed.
Where a dispute arises as to this point, the
question is one for the jury. Smith v.
Gallegos (1965) 16 U 2d 344, 400 P 2d 570.
"Immediate hazard."
In action arising out of collision between
automobile driven by plaintiff and truck
driven by defendant at intersection where
plaintiff made left turn across path of
approaching traffic, evidence conclusively
established that truck was so close to intersection at time plaintiff made left turn as to
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constitute an "immediate hazard." French v.
Utah Oil Refining Co. (1950) 117 U 406, 216 P
2d 1002, distinguished in 121 U 143, 239 P 2d
215.
Where the defendant attempted to turn
across the path of the plaintiff, when he was
only 40 feet away, the trial court could
reasonably conclude that plaintiff was so
close as to constitute an immediate hazard
and that the defendant should have yielded
the right-of-way to him. Yeates v. Budge
(1953) 122 U 518, 252 P 2d 220.
Instructions.
There is no right to an instruction covering
the qualifying part of this section, unless
there is evidence to support such a charge.
State v. Newton (1943) 105 U 561, 144 P 2d
290.
Involuntary manslaughter.
Under a former section in R.S. 1933, which
is practically identical with this section, it
was held, in reversing a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter, that no criminal
liability is imposed upon the defendant
because he crossed the line of northbound
traffic, unless he did so recklessly or in
willful or wanton disregard of the rights and
safety of others. State v. Adamson (1942) 101
U 534, 125 P 2d 429.
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution
arising out of collision by defendant's car
with car in which decedent was riding,
wherein evidence showed that latter car, is
making left turn short distance beyond intersection for purpose of entering intersecting
street, had crossed almost completely over
two lanes for oncoming traffic and had made
short backward movement before impact
from defendant's
oncoming automobile
occurred, it could not be said as matter of
law that left turn was not made in exercise
of due care and, under all evidence, jury
could find that, by reason of defendant's
intoxicated condition, he failed to react in

normal manner to situation which confronted him, and that his conduct was
responsible cause of collision and resulting
death. State v. McQuilkin (1948) 113 U 268,
193 P 2d 433, distinguishing 110 U 45, 169 P
2d 777.
Violation of statute.
Motorist who signaled for left turn and
had almost completed it when defendant,
who had just started from parked position,
collided with rear end of motorist's car while
trying to go through intersection, was not
shown to have violated this section, notwithstanding that evidence was at best controversial and was somewhat based on estimates as
to split-second circumstances as to time, distance and judgment. Hawkins v. Allen (1965)
16 U 2d 293, 400 P 2d 12.
Collateral References.
Automobiles e=> 171(4).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 363.
7A AmJur 2d 431, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 256. .
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 ALR
1178.
Liability for accident arising from failure
of motorist to give signal for left turn at
intersection as against motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, 39 ALR 2d 15.
Liability for accident arising from failure
of motorist to give signal for left turn at
intersection, as against oncoming or intersecting motor vehicle, 39 ALR 2d 65.
Liability for accident arising from failure
of motorist to give signal for left turn
between intersections, 39 ALR 2d 103.
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of
motor vehicles proceeding in the same direction, where one or both attempt to pass on
left of another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR
2d 317.
What is street or highway intersection
within traffic rules, 7 ALR 3d 1204.

41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through highway. (a) The driver of a
vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered
the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so
closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but
said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the
right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop
sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at
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one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway
and shall proteed cautiously, yield right of way to vehicles not so obliged
to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to
constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 61; C. 1943,
57-7-138;L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment substituted "yield
right of way" for "yielding" in subsec. (b).
Construction and application.
Defendant motorist on through highway,
who was approaching intersection 400 to 500
feet therefrom at 45 miles per hour when
plaintiff motorist attempted to cross highway
at intersection after having stopped at stop
sign, was not approaching so closely as to
constitute "immediate hazard" within meaning of municipal ordinance conforming to
this section, and therefore
ordinance
required defendant to yield right-of-way to
plaintiff. (Rev. Ord. Salt Lake City 1944,
§ 6128 (c) 2.) Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U
1, 190 P 2d 514.
A person is not guilty of negligence as a
matter of law in traversing an intersection at
a speed of five or six miles per hour. It is a
proper question to be answered by the jury
under proper instructions. Bates v. Burns
(1955)3 U 2d 180, 281 P 2d 209.
Immediate hazard.
There is no precise set of measurements by
which an immediate hazard can be gauged,
but it must be judged on the basis of common
sense in the light of the existing circumstances. Richards v. Anderson (1959) 9 U 2d
17,337 P 2d 59.
Where believable but controversial evidence based on estimates of split-second circumstances showed that plaintiff had almost
completed a left turn when defendant, who
had just pulled out of a parked position, collided with the rear end of plaintiff's vehicle
while attempting to go through the intersection, the trial court, in its discretion, could
find that defendant was negligent and plaintiff was nonnegligent; and the Supreme Court
could not hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to
yield right-of-way where there was an
immediate hazard. Hawkins v. Allen (1965)
16 U 2d 293, 400 P 2d 12.
Negligence, contributory negligence and
last clear chance.
Plaintiff motorist, who stopped at stop sign
on intersecting street and observed defendant's car 400 to 500 feet away on through

highway approaching
intersection
at
unknown speed, in starting forward from
point 20 feet back from intersection and driving into and almost across intersection for
distance of 65 feet without again looking in
direction from which defendant's car was
approaching, was contributorily negligent as
matter of law, barring recovery for damages
arising out of collision, notwithstanding that
plaintiff had right-of-way over defendant by
virtue of municipal ordinance conforming to
this section, and even though plaintiff had
concluded upon observing defendant's car
that he had time to clear intersection, and
last clear chance doctrine was inapplicable.
(Rev. Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128 (c) 2.)
Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 1, 190 P 2d
514.
Driver of truck traveling between 30 and
45 miles per hour on arterial highway who,
when at least one-quarter of block from
intersection, observed car approaching from
his left which was closer to intersection than
truck, but did not again look in direction of
car until it was too late to avoid collision
because of assumption that truck had rightof-way by virtue of stop sign, was negligent
as matter of law. Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113
U 276, 193 P 2d 437.
Plaintiff motorist driving on preferred
highway, who had ample time to observe and
avoid a collision with defendant motorist
entering the highway, was guilty of contributory negligence. Richards v. Anderson (1959)
9 U 2d 17,337 P 2d 59.
Rights and duties of respective drivers.
Regardless of which driver is technically
entitled to right-of-way, both must use due
care and caution in proceeding into and
across intersection and both have burden to
keep proper lookout and to use reasonable
care to avoid collision, and neither should be
permitted to close his eyes to other vehicles
which he knows or has reason to believe are
approaching, merely because statute or
municipal ordinance designates him the preferred driver. Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U
1, 190 P 2d 514.
Fact that plaintiff motorist, in crossing
through highway at intersection after having
stopped at stop sign, had right-of-way over
defendant motorist on through highway by
virtue of municipal ordinance conforming to
this section, did not permit plaintiff, after
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having observed defendant's car approaching
intersection, to thereafter completely ignore
that car even though at time plaintiff started
he might reasonably have believed that he
had time in which to get safely across. (Rev.
Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128(c) 2.) Hickok
v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 1, 190 P 2d 514.
Driver may cross over arterial highway
after having stopped at stop sign, although
he must yield right-of-way to cars which are
close enough to constitute immediate hazard.
Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d
437.
Duty to keep proper lookout applies as well
to favored as to disfavored driver, and neither can excuse his own failure to observe
because other driver failed in his duty, and
neither is excused for want of diligence or
failure to see what is plain to be seen.
Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d
437.
Driver on arterial highway has duty to
remain reasonably alert to possibility of disfavored driver starting across intersection in

belief that he can cross in safety. Conklin v.
Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d 437.
A driver entering the intersection first
does not necessarily have the right-of-way.
Williams v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Institution (1957) 6 U 2d 283, 312 P 2d 564.
If the disfavored driver has made his stop
and deferred to all vehicles that would be
required to brake sharply or suddenly to
avoid collision, the cars far enough away to
have a clear margin to observe and make a
smooth, safe stop are not an "immediate
hazard" and are required to yield. Richards
v. Anderson (1959) 9 U 2d 17,337 P 2d 59.
Collateral References.
Automobiles e=> 171(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 350.
7A AmJur 2d 413, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 240.
Rights and duties at intersection of arterial (or other favored) highway and
nonfavored highway, 58 ALR 1197, 81 ALR
185.

41-6-74.10. Failure to yield right of way - Effect of collision Rule on entering stop or yield intersection. Yield right of way. (a) In
the event that a driver, after having driven past a yield sign or a stop
sign, is involved in a collision with a pedestrian having right of way in
a crosswalk or a vehicle having right of way in the intersection such collision shall be deemed prim a f acie evidence of his failure to yield the right
of way as required by this section, but shall not be considered negligence
per se in determining legal liability for such accident.
(b) Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection. Except when directed to
proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a vehicle
approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop as
required by section 41-6-99 and after having stopped shall yield the right
of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another
highway or which is approaching so closely on another highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving
across or within the intersection.
section 41-6-80, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
section 41-6-82, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah
Title of Act.
1955; section 41-6-97, Utah Code Annotated
An act amending sections 41-6-2, 41-6-3, 1953, as amended by chapter 65, Laws of
41-6-4, 41-6-5, and 41-6-9, Utah Code Anno- Utah 1949; section 41-6-98, and 41-6-99, Utah
tated 1953; section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 71, Laws Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-100.10,
of Utah 1955; section 41-6-17,41-6-24, 41-6-27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by
41-6-29, 41-6-35, 41-6-37, and 41-6-72, Utah chapter 66, Laws of Utah 1959; section
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-72.10, 41-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955;
section 41-6-140, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955; section
41-6-73, 41-6-74, Utah Code Annotated 1953; as amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah
History: C. 1953, 41-6-74.10,enacted by L.
1961, ch. 86, § 2.
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1955; section 41-6-140.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-140.20, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 71,
Laws of Utah 1955; section 41-6-145, Utah
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-150, Utah
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-160, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
78, Laws of Utah 1957, pertaining to regulating traffic on highways; and enacting new
sections to be known as 41-6-74.10,
41-6-148.10, 41-6-148.30, 41-6-148.40, and
41-6-169.10, respecting safety belts, modifying the structure of vehicles, safety chains

41-6-76

on trailers, and obeying commands of a
police officer. - Laws 1961, ch. 86.
Operation and effect.
Where the evidence was unclear as to
whether defendant's entry into a regulated
intersection
constituted an "immediate
hazard" to the plaintiff, such question should
have been given to the jury and it was error
for the trial judge to instruct that the occurrence of a collision was prima facie evidence
that plaintiff had the right-of-way. Johnson
v. Cornwall Warehouse Co. (1964) 15 U 2d
172,389 P 2d 710.

41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than from another
roadway. The driver of a vehicle about to enter or· cross a highway from
any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all
vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 62; C. 1943,
57-7-139; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 28; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 21.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment inserted "or from
any place other than another roadway"; and
substituted "the roadway to be entered or
crossed" at the end of the section for "said
highway."
The 1978 amendment deleted "a private
road or driveway or from" before "any
place."
Contributory negligence.
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, where plaintiff, driving at 25 miles per hour on icy highway, first saw defendant's bus being backed
out of yard when plaintiff was approximately
300 feet from defendant's driveway, and
plaintiff applied his brakes when about half
the distance from the driveway upon realizing that defendant was not going to yield
right-of-way, but was unable to avoid collision with defendant who had backed entirely
across road. Nielson v. Mauchley (1949) 115 U
68, 202 P 2d 547.
Last clear chance doctrine.
The doctrine of last clear chance is well
established in Utah, not only where the
defendant actually knew of plaintiff's peril,
but also where defendant, in the exercise of

reasonable care, should have known that
plaintiff was so endangered. Beckstrom v.
Williams (1955) 3 U 2d 210, 282 P 2d 309.
As a general rule the doctrine of last clear
chance is of limited application in the case of
two moving vehicles as the application of the
doctrine in a case where both vehicles were
moving and rapidly changing positions with
respect to one another is fraught with difficulties. However, where one vehicle is
moving very slowly this limitation of the doctrine is much less cogent. Beckstrom v.
Williams (1955) 3 U 2d 210, 282 P 2d 309.
Rights and duties of drivers.
This section does not give driver of vehicle
who has right-of-way the right to proceed
without regard to existing conditions, and
such driver must exercise due care and act as
reasonably prudent man would act under all
existing circumstances. Nielson v. Mauchley
(1949) 115 U 68, 202 P 2d 547.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <P 167(3).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 347.
7A AmJur 2d 417, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242.
Duty at private crossing or driveway, 24
ALR946.
Private driveway, right of way as between
vehicles in street or highway and vehicles
approaching from, 50 ALR 283.

41-6-76. Emergency vehicle Duties of respective
drivers.
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle
making use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of this
act, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible
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signal only, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way
and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized
emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police
officer.
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 63; C. 1943,
57-7-140; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1;
1975, ch. 207, § 29.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "equipped
with at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red
light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the
front of such vehicle and" after "authorized
emergency vehicle" near the beginning of
subsec. (a).
The 1955 amendment deleted the provision
inserted by the 1949 amendment; and substituted "making use of audible and visual
signals meeting the requirements of this act"
in subsec. (a) for "when the driver is giving

audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle or
bell."
The 1975 amendment inserted "or of a
police vehicle properly and lawfully making
use of an audible signal only" in subsec. (a).
Collateral References.
Automobiles IP 175(3).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 371.
7A AmJur 2d 419, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 244.
Policeman, right of way of vehicle carrying, 65 ALR 140.
Validity of statute or ordinance giving
right of way in streets or highways to certain
classes of vehicles, 38 ALR 24.

41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway - Right
of way. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to any
authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually engaged in work upon a highway
within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated by official
traffic-control devices.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to any authorized
vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a highway whenever
such vehicle displays lights meeting the requirements of section
41-6-140.20.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-76.10,enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 30.
Title of Act.
An act amending sections 41-6-2, 41-6-4,
and 41-6-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1961,
section 41-6-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957,
as amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah
1961, sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 41-6-76, and
41-6-90, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955,
section 41-6-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955,
as amended by chapter 81, Laws of Utah
1973, sections 41-6-9 and 41-6-82, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 71,

Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chapter
86, Laws of Utah 1961, sections 41-6-10,
41-6-25, 41-6-26, 41-6-53, 41-6-57, 41-6-58,
41-6-59, 41-6-61, 41-6-62, 41-6-65, 41-6-66,
41-6-67, 41-6-75, 41-6-78, 41-6-85, 41-6-88,
41-6-101, 41-6-102, 41-6-104, 41-6-106,
41-6-110, 41-6-111, 41-6-112, 41-6-143,
41-6-146, 41-6-151, and 41-6-152, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, section 41-6-24, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 86,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter
81, Laws of Utah 1973, section 41-6-64, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as re-enacted by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955, section 41-6-69,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by
chapter 96, Laws of Utah 1971, sections
41-6-72 and 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated
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1953, as amended by chapter 86, Laws of
Utah 1961, section 41-6-100.10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 66,
Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by chapter
86, Laws of Utah 1961, section 41-6-141,Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
71, Laws of Utah 1955, section 41-6-142,Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
71, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chapter 93, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-151.5,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1973, enacting sections 41-6-19.10, 41-6-76.10, 41-6-79.20,
41-6-82.10,
41-6-106.10,
41-6-108.10,
41-6-109.10,41-6-116.10,and 41-6-175.5, Utah
Code Annotated
1953, repealing
and
re-enacting section 41-6-48, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 77, Laws
of Utah 1957, as amended by chapter 81,
Laws of Utah 1973, section 41-6-72.10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter
71, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1961, and section
41-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 110, Laws of Utah 1969,
and repealing section 41-6-52.1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 77,
Laws of Utah 1957, section 41-6-63, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
78, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1959;providing for additional and extended definitions; providing for
traffic and pedestrian
movements at
signalized intersections and along roadways;

41-6-77

altering the prima facie limit and allowing
cities of the second and third class authority
to change prima facie speed limits after a
traffic engineering study; clarifying driving
to the left of the center line, land use and
prohibition ·of limited-access roadway use;
clarification of procedures for left, right and
U-turns; modifying the right-of-way rule at
uncontrolled intersections; pertaining to
bicycle equipment and driver activity; changing the stopping requirements for vehicles on
overtaking a school bus; enlarging a police
officer's right to move abandoned and parked
vehicles; changing the responsibility of testing certain equipment from the state road
commission to the department of public
safety; and deleting redundant sections relating to collisions involving fixtures and
"resume speed" road signs. - Laws 1975, ch.
207.
Collateral References.
Automobiles cS::o160(5).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 382.
7A AmJur 2d 421, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.
Liability for automobile accident, other
than direct collision with pedestrian, as
affected by reliance upon or disregard of
stop-and-go signal, 2 ALR 3d 12.
Liability for collision of automobile with
pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal,
2 ALR 3d 155.

ARTICLE 10
PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Section
41-6-77.
41-6-78.
41-6-79.
41-6-79.10.
41-6-79.20.
41-6-80.

Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices - Other controls.
Pedestrians' right of way.
Pedestrians yielding right of way.
Emergency vehicle - Duties of driver and pedestrian.
Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or barrier prohibited.
Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians and human-powered vehicles
- Audible signals to be given.
41-6-80.1. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons - Exceptions - Use of cane Liability.
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Driver to yield.
Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.
41-6-81.
Walking along or upon roadways - Standing in roadway for prohibited purposes
41-6-82.
- Yielding right of way to vehicles - Pedestrians under the influence.
41-6-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions on pedestrian.

41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices - Other controls. (1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official trafficcontrol device specifically applicable to such pedestrian unless otherwise
directed by a police officer.
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(2) Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic and pedestrian-control signals
as provided in sections 64-6-24[41-6-24]and 41-6-25.
(3) At all other places, pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and
be subject to the restrictions stated in this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-77, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 49.

The bracketed reference to 41-6-24 was
inserted by the compiler.

Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 49 repealed old section
41-6-77 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 64; C. 1943, 57-7-141;
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1), declaring
pedestrians subject to traffic-control signals
at intersections
and empowering local
authorities to regulate the crossing of roadways by pedestrians, and enacted new section
41-6-77.

Collateral References.
Automobiles <P 5-7, 160(3).
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 35; 60A CJS Motor
Vehicles§ 382.
Rights and duties of pedestrians, 7A
AmJur 2d 467 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic§ 285 et seq.

41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. (1) (a) When traffic-control
signals are not in place or not in operation the driver of a vehicle shall
yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if necessary to yield, to
a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian
is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or
when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of
the roadway as to be in danger.
(b) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute
an immediate hazard. Paragraph (1) (a) shall not apply under the conditions stated in section 41-6-79(2).
(2) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the
roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall
not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 65; C. 1943,
57-7-142; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 31; 1978, ch. 33, § 22.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment deleted "approaching
so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger," after "the pedestrian is" in subsec. (a).
The 1975 amendment substituted "so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard" at the
end of the first sentence in subsec. (a) for "so
close that it is impossible for the driver to
yield."
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); substituted "Paragraph (l)(a)" at the beginning of the second
sentence of subd. (l)(b) for "This provision";
and made minor changes in phraseology,
punctuation and style.

Crosswalks.
Formerly a pedestrian was required to use
crosswalks provided such crossing was within
300 feet of another regular crossing of same
highway. Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co.
(1929) 75 U 87, 283 P 160.
Duty of driver to yield right-of-way.
Statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians
the right-of-way at street crossings create a
preferential but not an absolute right in the
pedestrian's favor, and before the duty of a
driver to yield the right-of-way arises, he
must be in a situation whereby he is either
aware of the presence of the pedestrian or
should have, in the exercise of reasonable
care, become aware of the presence of the
pedestrian in time to yield the right-of-way.
Charvoz v. Cottrell (1961) 12 U 2d 25, 361 P
2d 516.
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Right-of-way.
A pedestrian in a marked crosswalk has
the right-of-way. The right-of-way rule
simply means this: that if two persons are so
proceeding that if they continued their
course there would be danger of collision, the
disfavored one must give way, and the
favored one (the pedestrian) may proceed;
and the favored one may assume that this
will be done. It is of course recognized that
the right-of-way rule would not apply if,
when the favored one approached the crossing point, the disfavored one was so close
that in due care he could not or should not
reasonably be expected to give way. Coombs
v. Perry (1954) 2 U 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680.

Lake City was held to be contributorily negligent as matter of law in failing to keep
proper lookout for approaching traffic.
In determining whether it must be ruled as
a matter of law that a pedestrian herself was
negligent which contributed to cause her
injury, consideration must be given, not only
to the fact that she had the right-of-way
upon which she could place some reliance,
but also that a pedestrian crossing a busy
street must be constantly vigilant for her
safety with respect to all of the conditions
around her. Even if a car is seen approaching, unless it is so positioned as to constitute
an immediate hazard to her, she is not necessarily obliged to focus full and undivided
attention on that particular car and so calculate her entire conduct as to avoid being
struck by it. This is not to say that a pedestrian may claim a right-of-way in face of
danger. She must of course be watching for
automobiles or other vehicles on the street,
particularly from the direction whence traffic
was most likely to come. Due care requires
that she also keep a lookout ahead for other
pedestrians, possible holes or obstructions in
the street, and at least remain aware of the
possibility of other traffic. Coombs v. Perry
(1954) 2 U 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680.

Rights and duties of pedestrians generally
- Contributory negligence.
Rights of pedestrians to use public streets
are same as those of motorists and hence
same general duties devolve upon them, and
pedestrian crossing public street in crosswalk
or pedestrian lane, although he may have
right-of-way over vehicular traffic, has duty
to observe such traffic, so that pedestrian
who undertakes to cross busy street of large
city, without first observing for vehicular
traffic, is guilty of contributory negligence,
even though he may be crossing in crosswalk
and have right-of-way. Mingus v. Olsson
(1949) 114 U 505, 201 P 2d 495, where
deceased pedestrian who was struck by car
while crossing street on crosswalk in Salt

Collateral References.
Automobiles <S:::>160(4).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 388.
Right of way as between pedestrian and
vehicles, 7A AmJur 2d 421-423, Automobiles
and Highway Traffic §§ 245-247.
Darting or stepping suddenly into path of
car, 65 ALR 192, 113 ALR 528.
Duty to look before crossing street or highway, 79 ALR 1073.
Duty to look for vehicles approaching on
intersecting street, 9 ALR 1248,44 ALR 1299.
Failure to comply with statute regulating
travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death
resulting from collision with automobile, 45
ALR 3d 658.

Instructions on "sudden emergency."
It was not error for the trial court to
refuse to give an instruction on sudden emergency where the plaintiff's requested instruction did not cover the requisite element that
the emergency must be one which arose
without fault on the part of the plaintiff and
defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff
ran in front of defendant's vehicle when the
latter was too close to avoid striking him.
Gittens v. Lundberg (1955) 3 U 2d 392, 284 P
2d 1115.

41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way. (1) Every pedestrian
crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right
of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
(2) A.ny pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are
in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked
crosswalk.
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(4) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless
authorized by official traffic-control devices; and, when authorized to cross
diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official traffic-control devices pertaining to such crossing movements.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 32; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 23.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 32 repealed old
section 41-6-79 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 66; C. 1943,
57-7-143; L. 1969, ch. 110, § 1), relating to
pedestrians yielding the right of way, crossing roadways only at marked crosswalks and
prohibiting pedestrians from crossing intersections diagonally, and enacted new section
41-6-79.
The 1978 amendment inserted "accordance
with the official traffic-control devices pertaining to" in subsec. (4); and made minor
changes in style.
Construction and application.
Pedestrian was contributorily negligent as
matter of law, where he proceeded to cross
street at night at place other than marked
crosswalk, knowing that there were traffic
control lights and marked crosswalks at
adjacent intersections, and failed to constantly observe movement of approaching
traffic after reaching a position approximately eight feet past center of street. Sant
v. Miller (1949) 115 U 559, 206 P 2d 719.
Pedestrian who was walking across poorly
lit highway was contributorily negligent as a
matter of Jaw where, in response to a call
from his wife, he turned and walked directly
into path of defendant's automobile. Crossing
a highway at a point where there was no
marked crosswalk, the pedestrian was duty
bound to yield the right-of-way to a vehicle
upon the roadway. Cox v. Thompson (1953)
123 U 81, 254 P 2d 1047.
Exclusion of rebuttal testimony as to
motorist's speed and refusal to reopen case to
permit introduction of such testimony was
not prejudicial error in suit to recover for
death of pedestrian who was struck while
crossing street in area other than marked
crosswalk since there was evidence as to
decedent's negligence. Duncan v. Western
Refrigeration Co. (1960) 11 U 2d 19, 354 P 2d
572.
Contributory negligence.
A pedestrian was guilty of contributory
negligence where after walking across two
lanes of a four-lane highway within a
marked crosswalk she left the crosswalk and

walked down the center of the street. By
attempting to cross the street in disregard of
safety rules, she was charged with a high
standard of care, the duty being commensurate with the perilous circumstances. Smith
v. Bennett (1953) 1 U 2d 224, 265 P 2d 401.
Instruction.
An instruction given literally in accord
with former subsec. (a) of this section was
not erroneous for failure to add "so near as
to constitute an immediate hazard" since
there were no circumstances requiring such
addition. Holmes v. Heidebrecht (1960) 10 U
2d 74, 348 P 2d 565.
An instruction in the words of former
subsec. (a) of this section simply means that
where two persons are proceeding in such
manner that if they continued there would be
a collision, the disfavored one must give way
and the favored one may proceed. It does not
mean that the favored one may claim the
right-of-way over the disfavored one regardless of the hazards involved. Fox v. Taylor
(1960) 10 U 2d 174, 350 P 2d 154.
Operation and effect.
The right-of-way statutes are designed to
prevent an accident by two persons, both
otherwise lawfully on the roadway, reaching
the same place at the same time. The rightof-way is not absolute for either pedestrian
or motorist, but both have a continuing duty
at all times to use reasonable care for the
safety of others, even when one has the
right-of-way over the other. Langlois v. Rees
(1960) 10 U 2d 272, 351 P 2d 638.
Pedestrian walking along driveway.
Motorist's general duty to stop before
crossing sidewalk was not applicable to
situation in which pedestrian was walking
along driveway and was not on a sidewalk
when struck by car backing from garage;
both parties had duty to use due care for
safety of themselves and each other. Ivie v.
Richardson (1959) 9 U 2d 5,336 P 2d 781.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <S:,, 160(1).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 389.
7A AmJur 2d 467, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 286.
Crossing street at unusual place or diagonally, 14 ALR 1176, 67 ALR 313.
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41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle -

Duties of driver and pedestrian.
emergency vehicle
making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of section
41-6-146,and visual signals meeting the requirements of section 41-6-14 or
section 41-6-140, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use
of an audible signal, every pedestrian shall yield the right of way to the
authorized emergency vehicle.
(2) This section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons
using the highway, nor from the duty to exercise due care to avoid colliding
with any pedestrian.
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized

History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.10,enacted by L.
1975,ch. 207, § 33; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 24.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment substituted "section
41-6-14 or section 41-6-140" for "section
41-6-140" in subsec. (1); and made minor
changes in phraseology and style.

41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or barrier prohibited. No pedestrian shall pass through, around, over or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing or bridge while such gate or
barrier is closed or is being opened or closed.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.20, enacted by L.
1975,ch. 207, § 34.

41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians and
human-powered vehicles - Audible signals to be given. Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter or any local ordinance, every driver
of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian
or any person propelling a human powered vehicle and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing
any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80, enacted by L.
1978,ch. 33, § 39.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1969, ch. 111, § 7 repealed old section
41-6-80 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 67; C. 1943, 57-7-144;

L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to driver's duty
to exercise due care on observing a child,
incapacitated person or person with a white
cane or guide dog, and new section 41-6-80
was enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 39.

41-6-80.l. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons - Exceptions - Use of cane - Liability. (1) The driver of a vehicle approaching
a blind or partially blind pedestrian crossing a roadway or thoroughfare,
carrying a cane predominately white or metallic in color (with or without
a red tip) or using a guide dog, shall bring his vehicle to a complete stop
and yield the right of way to the blind person. Any person who fails to
stop and yield the right of way is liable for any loss or damage which
results as a proximate cause of failure to yield the right of way to blind
persons; except that blind or partially blind persons shall exercise due care
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in approaching and crossing said roadways and thoroughfares and shall
yield right of way to emergency vehicles sounding a bell, a siren or other
noise device.
(2) A person blind or partially blind, and no other person, may carry
a cane as described in subsection (1).
History:
§ 25.

L. 1969, ch. 111, § 3; 1978, ch. 33,

Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment deleted "motor"
before "vehicle" near the beginning of
subsec. (1); and made a minor change in
phraseology.

Repealing Clause.
Section 7 of Laws 1969, ch. 111 provided:
"Section 41-6-80, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah,
1961, is repealed."
Cross-References.
Rights and privileges of blind and disabled
persons, 26-30-1 et seq.

41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Driver to yield. The driver
of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian and all other traffic on the sidewalk.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80.5, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 40.

41-6-81. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks. Pedestrians
shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks.
History:
57-7-145.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 68; C. 1943,

Collateral References.
Automobiles ~ 160(4).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 389.

41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways - Standing in roadway
for prohibited purposes - Yielding right of way to vehicles - Pedestrians under the influence. (1) Where sidewalks are provided and their
use is practicable, it is unlawful for any pedestrians to walk along and
upon an adjacent roadway.
(2) Where sidewalks are not provided any pedestrians walking along
and upon a highway shall when practicable walk only on a shoulder as
far as practicable from the edge of the roadway.
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, any pedestrian
walking along or upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an
outside edge of the roadway, and if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only
on the left side of the roadway.
(4) No person shall stand in a roadway or shoulder area for the purpose
of soliciting from the occupant of any vehicle a ride, employment, the parking, watching or guarding of a vehicle or other business.
(5) No pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug to
a degree which renders such person a hazard shall walk or be upon a highway except on a sidewalk or sidewalk area.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, pedestrians upon a
roadway, shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 69; C. 1943,
57-7-146; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1;

1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 35; 1978, ch.
33, § 26.
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The 1949 amendment inserted subsec. (a);
designated the provisions prohibiting solicitation of rides as subsec. (c); and added
subsec. (b).
The 1955 amendment added the prohibitions against soliciting employment, parking,
watching or guarding a vehicle or other business to subsec. (c).
The 1961 amendment substituted "pedestrians" for "pedestrian" in subsecs. (a) and
(b); and made a minor change in phraseology.
The 1975 amendment inserted "and their
use is practicable" in subsec. (a); substituted
"walk only on a shoulder as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway" in
subsec. (b) for "walk only on the left side of
the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic
which may approach from the opposite direction"; inserted subsec. (c); redesignated
former subsec. (c) as subsec. (d); inserted "or

41-6-82.10

shoulder area" in subsec. (d); and added
subsec. (e).
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (d) as (1) to (4); inserted subsec. (5);
redesignated subsec. (e) as (6); and made
minor changes in phraseology.
Collateral References.

Admissibility of evidence of habit, customary behavior, or reputation as to care of
pedestrian on question of his care at time of
collision with motor vehicle giving rise to his
injury or death, 28 ALR 3d 1293.
Anti-hitchhiking laws, their construction
and effect in action for injury to hitchhiker,
18 ALR 1447, 68 ALR 2d 300.
Failure to comply with statute regulating
travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death
resulting from collision with automobile, 45
ALR 3d 658.
Walking on left-hand side of road, 67 ALR
96, 93 ALR 551.

41-6-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions on pedestrian. The department of transportation and local authorities in their
respective jurisdictions may after an engineering and traffic investigation
designate unmarked crosswalk locations where pedestrian crossing is prohibited or where pedestrians must yield the right of way to vehicles. [Such]
restrictions shall be effective only when official traffic-control devices indicating the restrictions are in place.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.10,enacted by L.
1975,ch. 207, § 36; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 19.
Compiler's Notes.

mission"; and substituted "restrictions" for
"restriction."
The bracketed word "such" was inserted by
the compiler.

The 1979 amendment substituted "department of transportation" for "state road comARTICLE 11
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION
Section
41-6-83.
41-6-84.
41-6-85.
41-6-86.
41-6-87.
41-6-87.3.
41-6-87.4.
41-6-87.5.
41-6-87.7.
41-6-87.8.
41-6-87.9.
41-6-88.
41-6-89.
41-6-90.

Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act - Regulations applicable to bicycles.
Bicycle riders subject to chapter.
Regular seat required - Carrying more persons than design permits prohibited
- Exceptions.
Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to attach to vehicles - Exceptions.
Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway - Bicyclist's duties.
Bicycles to yield right of way to pedestrians - Laws applicable to pedestrians.
Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk - Prohibitions - Parking on roadway.
Bicycles - Turns - Designated bicycle lanes.
Bicycles - Turn signals.
Bicycle inspections - At request of officer.
Bicycle racing - Prohibitions - Exceptions - Exemptions from traffic laws.
One hand on handle bars.
Prohibited equipment - Brakes required.
Bicycles - Lamps required - Reflective material required.
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41-6-83. Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act
- Regulations applicable to bicycles. (a) The parent of any child and
the guardian of any ward shall not authorize or knowingly permit any such
child or ward to violate any of the provisions of this act.
(b) These regulations applicable to bicycles shall apply whenever a
bicycle is operated upon any highway or upon any path set aside for the
exclusive use of bicycles subject to those exceptions stated herein.
History:
57-7-147.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 70; C. 1943,

Cross-References.
Dealer licensing of bicycles, 11-21-1.

Collateral References.
Automobiles cs,,, 162(7).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 396.
Bicyclists, 7A AmJur 2d 851 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 618 et seq.

41-6-84. Bicycle riders subject to chapter. Every person riding a
bicycle is subject to the provisions of this chapter applicable to the driver
of a vehicle except as to those provisions of this chapter which by their
nature can have no application.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 71; C. 1943,
57-7-148;L. 1978, ch. 33, § 27.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment deleted "upon a roadway" after "bicycle" near the beginning: of
the section; substituted "chapter" for ••~t"'
in two places; and deleted "special regulations in this act and except as to those"
before "provisions of this chapter"; and made
minor changes in phraseology.

Cross-References.
Driving on right side of highway, exceptions, 41-6-53.
Child bicycle rider.
The child bicycle rider must exercise that
degree of care which ordinarily would be
observed by children of the same age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances, and whether a child acted negligently is a question for the jury to decide
according to this standard. Donohue v.
Rolando (1965) 16 U 2d 294, 400 P 2d 12.

41-6-85. Regular seat required - Carrying more persons than
design permits prohibited - Exceptions. (1) A person propelling a
bicycle shall not ride other than upon or astride a permanent and regular
seat attached thereto.
(2) No bicycle shall be used to carry more persons at one time than
the number for which it is designed or equipped, except that an adult rider
may carry a child securely attached to his person in a back pack or sling.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 72; C. 1943,
57-7-149; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 37; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 28.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment inserted "or astride"
in subsec. (a); deleted "nor carry any other
person upon such bicycle other than upon a
firmly attached and regular seat _thereon nor

shall any person ride upon a bicycle other
than as above authorized" at the end of
subsec. (a); and made a minor change in
phraseology.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); added the exception
to subsec. (2); and made minor changes in
phraseology.

41-6-86. Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to attach to vehicles - Exceptions. (1) No person riding a bicycle, coaster, roller skates,
sled, or toy vehicle shall attach the same or himself to any vehicle upon
a roadway.
386

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-87.3

(2) This section shall not prohibit attaching a bicycle trailer or bicycle
semitrailer to a bicycle if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for
such attachment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943,
57-7-150;L. 1978,ch. 33, § 29.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment designated the
former section as subsec. (1); added subsec.
(2); and made a minor change in phraseology.

41-6-87. Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway - Bicyclist's
duties. (1) Every person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall ride
as near to the right side of the roadway as practicable, exercising due care
when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction.
(2) Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway shall not ride more than
two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast shall not impede the
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall
ride within a single lane.
(3) Wherever a usable 'path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to
a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943,
57-7-151;L. 1949,ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 30.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted subsec. (a);
designated the provisions for riding two
abreast as subsec. (b); and added subsec. (c).
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); added the second sen. tence of subsec. (2); and made minor changes
in phraseology and punctuation.

the statutory violation rule is nullified where
children are involved. If the violation of a
statute by a child is found to evidence less
care than that which ordinarily could be
expected of a child of the same age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience, he could be
held contributorily negligent barring his
recovery by a jury as a question of fact about
which there might be reasonable difference
of opinion. Morby v. Rogers (1953) 122 U 540,
252 P 2d 231.

Contributory negligence.
The rule in this jurisdiction that a Jaw
violation is negligence as a matter of law
does not overcome the rule that the contributory negligence of a child is to be determined
according to the proper standard of care with
which he is charged. It does not mean that

Collateral References.
Automobiles <9 162(7).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 396.
7A AmJur 2d 854, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 620.
Reciprocal duties of driver of automobile
and bicyclist, 172 ALR 736.

41-6-87.3. Bicycles to yield right of way to pedestrians - Laws
applicable to pedestrians. (1) A person propelling a bicycle upon and
along a sidewalk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall
yield the right of way to any pedestrian and shall give audible signal
before overtaking and passing such pedestrian.
(2) A person shall not ride a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or
across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, where use of bicycles is prohibited by official traffic-control devices.
(3) A person propelling a vehicle by human power upon and along a
sidewalk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall have all
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the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.3, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 41.

41-6-87.4. Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk - Prohibitions - Parking on roadway. (1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless
prohibited or restricted by an official traffic-control device.
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk shall not impede the normal and
reasonable movement of pedestrian or other traffic.
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to the curb
or edge of the roadway at any location where parking is allowed.
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of another bicycle
or bicycles near the side of the roadway at any location where parking is
allowed.
(5) A person shall not park a bicycle on a roadway in such a manner
as to obstruct the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle.
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a highway shall
conform with the provisions of article 14 regulating the parking of vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.4, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 42.

41-6-87.5. Bicycles - Turns - Designated bicycle lanes. (1) A
person riding a bicycle intending to turn left shall comply with section
41-6-66 or subsection (2).
(2) A person riding a bicycle intending to turn left shall approach the
turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After
proceeding across the intersecting roadway, the turn shall be made as close
as practicable to the curb or edge of the roadway on the far side of the
intersection. After turning, the bicyclist shall comply with any official traffic-control device or police officer regulating traffic along the highway
intended to be traveled.
(3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the department of transportation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause
official traffic-control devices to be placed and thereby require and direct
that a specific course be traveled by turning bicycles, and when such
devices are so placed, no person shall turn a bicycle other than as directed
and required by such devices.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.5, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 43.

41-6-87.7. Bicycles - Turn signals. (1) Except as provided in this
section, a person riding a bicycle shall comply with section 41-6-69.
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be
given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the
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bicycle before turning, and shall be given while the bicycle is stopped waiting to turn. A signal by hand and arm need not be given continuously if
the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.7, enacted by L.
1978,ch. 33, § 44.

41-6-87.8. Bicycle inspections - At request of officer. A uniformed
police officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to believe that a bicycle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment
is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the person riding the bicycle
to stop and submit the bicycle to an inspection and such test with reference
thereto as may be appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.8, enacted by L.
1978,ch. 33, § 45.

41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing - Prohibitions - Exceptions - Exemptions from traffic laws. (1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited by
section 41-6-51, except as authorized in this section.
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is not unlawful when a racing event
is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their
respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events shall
be granted only under conditions which assure reasonable safety for all
race participants, spectators and other highway users, and which prevent
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seriously inconvenience other highway users.
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an
approved bicycle highway racing event may be exempted from compliance
with any traffic laws otherwise applicable, provided that traffic control is
adequate to assure the safety of all highway users.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.9, enacted by L.
1978,ch. 33, § 46.

41-6-88. One hand on handle bars. No person operating a bicycle shall
carry any package, bundle, or article which prevents the driver from keeping at least one hand upon the handle bars.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 75; C. 1943,
57-7-152;L. 1975, ch. 207, § 38.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "operating" for "riding"; and substituted "driver"
for "rider."

41-6-89. Prohibited equipment - Brakes required. (1) A bicycle
shall not be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon a bicycle, any
siren or whistle.
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes which will
enable its driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles
per hour on dry, level, clean pavement.
History:
L. 1941, ch. 52, § 76; C. 1943,
57-7-153;L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 31.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b).
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The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); deleted a requirement that bicycle be equipped with bell or

other device audible for 100 feet; and made
minor changes in phraseology.

41-6-90. Bicycles Lamps required
Reflective material
required. (1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in section
41-6-118 shall be equipped with a lamp on the front emitting a white light
visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and with a red
reflector of a type approved by the department which shall be visible for
500 feet to the rear when directly in front of lawful lower beams of head
lamps on a motor vehicle.
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times described in section 41-6-118
shall be equipped with reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity
to be visible from both sides for 500 feet when directly in front of lawful
lower beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle, or, in lieu of such reflective
material, with a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a distance of
at least 500 feet.
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in
addition to those required by subsections (1) and (2).
History: C. 1953, 41-6-90, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 50.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 50 repealed old section
41-6-90 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 77; C. 1943, 57-7-154;
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 39), relating to lights and reflectors on bicycles operated at night, and enacted new section
41-6-90.

Violation as negligence.
Riding of bicycle in dark without lamp was
violation of ordinance and this statute and
thus established some negligence as a matter
of law; whether absence of lamp was contributing proximate cause of collision between
bicycle and taxicab was jury question. Gibbs
v. Blue Cab (1952) 122 U 312, 249 P 2d 213.

ARTICLE 12
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES
Section
41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed.
41-6-93. Driving on tracks.
· 41-6-94. Driving through safety zone.

41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed.
Repeal.
Sections 41-6-91, 41-6-92 (L. 1941, ch. 52,
§§ 78, 79; C. 1943, 57-7-155, 57-7-156), relating

to passing railroad trains, were repealed by
Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74.

41-6-93. Driving on tracks. (a) It is unlawful for the driver of any
vehicle proceeding upon any track in front of a railroad train upon a street
to fail to remove such vehicle from the track as soon as practicable after
signal from the operator of such train.
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(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no driver
of a vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such
train within the intersection in front of such train.
History:
57-7-157.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 80; C. 1943,

Collateral References.
Liability for accident at point where highway leads to, but does not cross, railroad
tracks, 47 ALR 863.

41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. No vehicle shall at any time be
driven through or within a safety zone.
History:
57-7-158.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 81; C. 1943,

Collateral References.
Liability of owner of motor vehicle for
injury to person who has alighted from or is

waiting for streetcar, 47 ALR 1233, 123 ALR
791.
Validity of safety zone ordinance, 79 ALR
1328.

ARTICLE 13
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED
Section
41-6-95.

Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving through, around or under
gate or barrier prohibited.
41-6-95.5. Trains - Interference with vehicles limited.
Repealed.
41-6-96.
Railroad grade crossings - Certain vehicles must stop - Exceptions - Regula41-6-97.
tions.
Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power shovel, derrick or other equipment
41-6-98.
or structure.
41-6-99.
Designation of through highways - Stop signs, yield signs and traffic-control
devices - Designation of intersections as locations for preferential right-ofway treatment.
Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings, private roads or driveways must stop
41-6-100.
prior to sidewalk area or street.
41-6-100.10. School bus - Signs and light signals - Flashing amber lights - Flashing red
lights - Passing school bus with caution - Duty to stop - Operation of
signals.

41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving
through, around or under gate or barrier prohibited. (a) Whenever any
person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver
of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than ten feet from
the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do
so safely when:
(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning
of the immediate approach of a train.
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train.
(3) A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 feet of the
highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such train
by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an immediate hazard.
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